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REFERENDUMS AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The people of the city of Milwaukee, like those of other Ameri-
can cities, are confronted by the increasing demand for racial inte-
gration. In the forefront of this struggle is the effort toward the
passage of an open-housing law. The conditions in Milwaukee, al-
though receiving attention at the national level, are not unlike those
which exist, or will exist, wherever open-housing legislation is
sought.
Prior to the passage of the open-housing ordinance in Mil-
waukee, many attempts to secure favorable legislation had failed.1
In the summer of 1967 its proponents began to demonstrate. The
demonstrations, in part, took the form of marches into the south side
of Milwaukee where much of the resistance to open housing is
found.2 In response to the marches the Milwaukee Citizens Civic
Voice (MCCV) was formed as an opposition group. Under the spon-
sorship of the MCCV, signatures were acquired and petitions were
filed, pursuant to Wisconsin statutes,3 requesting the Common Coun-
cil to adopt or to place on the ballot the following resolution:
BE IT RESOLVED:
That the Common Council of the City of Milwaukee SHALL
NOT enact any ordinance which in any manner restricts the
I See Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264 (ED. Wis. 1968).
2 Id. at 11.
3 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.20 (1967):
Direct legislation
(1) A number of electors equal to at least 15% of the votes cast for governor
at the last general election in their city may sign and file a petition with the
city clerk requesting that an attached proposed ordinance or resolution, with-
out alteration, either be adopted by the common council or be referred to a
vote of the electors ....
(3) ... When the original or amended petition is found to be sufficient and
the original or amended ordinance is in proper form, the city clerk shall so
state on the attached certificate and forward it to the common council imme-
diately.
(4) The common council shall, without alteration, either pass the ordinance
or resolution within 30 days following the date of the cierk's final certificate,
or submit it to the electors at the next election ....
(8) City ordinances or resolutions adopted under this section shall not be
subject to the veto power of the mayor and shall not be repealed or amended
within 2 years of adoption except by a vote of the electors. The common coun-
cil may submit a proposition to repeal or amend the ordinance or resolution
at any election.
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right of owners of real property to sell, lease or rent private
property.
The Common Council chose to submit the proposed resolution
to the electorate in a forthcoming 1968 election. Complainant, James
E. Otey, a Negro resident of the city of Milwaukee, alleged that the
proposal violated his fourteenth amendment rights4 and "[sought]
a judgment declaring the above-quoted resolution unconstitutional
and restraining the defendants [the Common Council of the City
of Milwaukee, the Board of Election Commissioners, and the City
Clerk] from acting upon it or submitting it to the electorate."5 In
Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee6 the district court, relying
heavily on Reitman v. Mulkey,7 declared the proposed resolution
to be unconstitutional and restrained the Common Council from
placing the proposal on the ballot.
The court in granting the injunctive relief adopted this lan-
guage from Tolbert v. Long,":
Certainly the remedy to enjoin the holding of the election would
be more direct, and better calculated to avoid complications,
than to remain passive until the law has been declared before
beginning a proceeding to test its constitutionality. 9
"Direct" and as uncomplicated as the injunction may be, the
propriety and wisdom of the relief are questionable.
I. JUDICIAL NON-INTERVENTION
Generally, the courts have been inclined to remain outside of
what are essentially legislative processes.'0 It is thought that it is
beyond the competency of the judiciary to exercise control by en-
joining legislative proceedings." This "hands-off" doctrine has been
4 Plaintiff alleges that he "has the right under the Fourteenth Amendment .. .
and § 1982 Title 42, U.S.C. to acquire, enjoy, inherit, lease, sell, hold, convey and
dispose of property free from discriminatory action .... " Otey v. Common Council of
Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 266 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
5 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 267 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
e Id.
7 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
8 134 Ga. 292, 295, 67 S.E. 826, 827 (1910).
9 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 279 (ED. Wis. 1968).
1o See, e.g., New Orleans Water Works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 US. 471 (1896);
Rheinhardt v. Yancey, 241 N.C. 184, 84 S.E.2d 655 (1954); Brubaker v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Elections, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 99, 128 N.E.2d 270 (C. P. 1955).
11 There are exceptions in which such proceedings are enjoined on the finding
that procedural irregularities exist. See, e.g., Williams v. Parrack, 83 Ariz. 227, 319
P.2d 989 (1957); Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand, 103 Ohio St. 286, 13 N.E. 556 (1921);
Unlimited Progress v. Portland, 213 Or. 193, 324 P.2d 239 (1958).
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ardently applied to the processes of initiative and referendum, which
are clearly recognized as powers which are legislative in character. 12
The Otey court, conceding that courts "may feel constrained
from interfering with an initiative," attempts to distinguish between
initiative and referendum, apparently in the belief that such labeling
will alter the legal consequences. 13 However, although the proposed
legislation has proceeded beyond the preliminary stages of the initi-
ative, the court is not given a green light to exercise its authority.
This ordinance was initiated by members of the electorate, and the
principle of non-interference in the legislative process extends to an
attempt to enact the measure in an election.14 Whether the proposal
is to be enacted by referendum or by direct legislation procedures
such as the initiative, the process should not be enjoined by the
courts.15
The appropriateness of the court's relief is subject to additional
misgivings. Such relief by a court of the United States is appropriate
12 Bardwell v. Parish Council of East Baton Rouge, 216 La. 537, 549, 44 So. 2d
107, 111 (1949):
The rule that a court of equity will not interfere with proposed acts of legis-
lation by a municipal council is, a fortiori, applicable to initiative and refer-
endum elections for, in those elections, it is the people themselves who
legislate ....
See Union v. Conlon, 19 App. Div. 2d 848, 243 N.YS.2d 484 (1964); Rheinhardt v.
Yancey, 241 N.C. 184, 84 S.E.2d 655 (1954); Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473, 104
N.E. 529 (1913).
13 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 275 (E.D. Wis. 1968).
Certainly there is a distinction between initiative and referendum. See Fordham and
Leach, Initiative and Referendum in Ohio, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 495 (1950). However the
doctrine of judicial non-interference has not hinged on this distinction, for both are
considered legislative in character.
The court felt that the "stage of direct legislation has been reached which opera-
tionally resembles a referendum, rather than an initiative." Otey v. Common Council
of Milwaukee, supra note 1, at 275. It infers therefore that there is no interference in
the legislative process. This represents a most limited and unrealistic view of the
"legislative process."
14 Bardwell v. Parish Council of East Baton Rouge, 216 La. 537, 44 So. 2d 107
(1949); Kilpatrick v. Searl, 366 Mich. 335, 115 N.W.2d 112 (1962); Barnes v. Barnett,
241 Miss. 206, 129 So. 2d 638 (1961); Pitman v. Drabelle, 267 Mo. 78, 183 S.W. 1055
(1916); Brubaker v. Montgomery County Bd. of Elections, 71 Ohio L. Abs. 99, 128
NXE.2d 270 (C.P. 1955); O'Neil v. Jones, 185 Tenn. 539, 206 S.W.2d 782 (1947); Glass v.
Smith, 238 S.W.2d 243 (Civ. App.), aff'd, 150 Tex. 632, 244 S.W.2d 645 (1951).
IS Greater Detroit Homeowners Council v. Wayne Circuit Judge Moynihan, No.
50819-/ (Mich. Sup. Ct. May 5, 1964). Here, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in a
situation much like that in Otey, stated that "the injunctive power of the judiciary
may not be invoked properly to restrain exercise of the right of initiative in this
state .... "
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only "in a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction."' 6 The
Otey court, in its attempt to dispel the defendant's claim of neutrality,
focuses on the Common Council's act of placing the proposed reso-
lution on the ballot.'7 The court thus infers from this act of the
Council that a "controversy" exists. However, neither the "Common
Council [nor] any if its members [was] responsible for circulation
of the petitions."' 8 It is indeed questionable that the mere act of
placing the proposed resolution on the ballot instigates a "definite
and concrete [controversy], touching the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest."' 9 The Council was acting pursuant
to Wisconsin Statutes20 in submitting the resolution to the electorate,
and the finding of a judicial controversy constitutes an undue ex-
pansion of concepts of judicial jurisdiction.2'
The constitutionality of the initiative was challenged before
the election was held; therefore the proposed resolution clearly did
not have the effect of law. It is certainly possible that, had the reso-
lution been referred to the electorate, it would have been defeated.22
In that event the Common Council would have been incapable of
enforcing the "ordinance" against the plaintiff23 and could not have
been accused of encouraging or authorizing private discrimination.24
16 Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964). See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). Accord,
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960), where the Supreme Court states that it
"has no jurisdiction to pronounce any statute, either of a state or of the United States,
void, because irreconcilable with the Constitution, except as it is called upon to ad-
judge the legal rights of litigants in actual controversies . .. "
'7 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 274 (ED. Wis. 1968).
18 Id.
19 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
20 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 9.20 (1967), quoted note 3 supra.
21 The Council could have enacted the resolution itself but chose to play a passive
role by simply placing it on the ballot. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 9.20 (1967) (4), quoted
note 3 supra.
22 See Dubuisson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 123 La. 443, 49 So. 15 (1909),
where the Court refused to enjoin a proposition because it could have been voted dovm
and therefore would not become law.
23 The Otey Court bases its jurisdiction, in part, on the belief that should the
resolution be enacted the common council would [refuse] to consider action in contra-
vention of its terms. Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 274
(ED. Wis. 1968). This is pure speculation, and in fact, the Council is authorized to
"... submit a proposition to repeal or amend the ordinance or resolution any elec-
tion." Wis. ANN. STAT. § 9.20 (1967) (8), quoted note 3 supra.
24 See Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77
YALE L.J. 692, 717 n.95 (1968): "Giving [Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)] the
broadest reasonable reading, however, it would only stand for the proposition that a
state may not act for the purpose of encouraging or authorizing private discrimination."
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The determination that the proposed resolution is in conflict
with the Constitution disregards cardinal rules of constitutional and
statutory interpretation.25 The federal courts, in the litigation of
"actual controversies . . . [have] rigidly adhered" to the principle
of refusing "to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it. ..- 2 On this basis the constitutional
challenge is premature and is not "ripe" for judicial resolution. The
court should wait until the resolution is enacted and has had a
chance to operate.27 Prior to the passage of the resolution, the court
can only speculate as to the manner in which the litigants will be
affected, 28 and the legal interests of the parties cannot be ascertained.
Judicial action is not warranted simply because the constitu-
tionality of the proposed resolution is subject to doubt. In Mulkey
v. Reitman the California Supreme Court observed that
Prior to its enactment the unconstitutionality of Proposition
14 was urged to this court in Lewis v. Jordan, Sac. 7549 (June
3, 1964). In rejecting the petition for mandamus to keep that
proposition off the ballot we stated in our minute order 'that it
would be more appropriate to pass on these questions after the
election ... than to interfere with the power of the people to
propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt
or reject the same at the polls . . .' But we further noted in the
order that 'there are grave questions whether the proposed
amendment to the California Constitution is valid under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution...'29
In addition, it is doubtful that plaintiff satisfied the require-
ments of "standing."30 The alleged injury was "experienced by
25 See Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REv.
193, 198 (1952):
The power of the courts, however final, can only be asserted in the course of
litigation. Advisory opinions are forbidden, and reefs of self-imitation have
grown up around the doctrine that courts will determine constitutional ques-
tions only in cases of actual controversy, when no lesser ground of decision is
available, and when the complaining party would be directly and personally
injured by the assertion of the power deemed unconstitutional ....
26 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960).
27 Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Pitman v. Drabelle, 67 Mo. 78, 183 S.W.
1055 (1916); Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473, 104 N.E. 529 (1913).
28 Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
20 64 Cal. 2d. 529, 535, 413 P.2d 825, 829, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 885 (1966), aft'd, 587
U.S. 369 (1967). The Otey court appears oblivious to this language even though it
relies so heavily on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
30 "When [plaintiff] brings his action as a representative of the general public,
the propriety of judicial intervention is sharply questioned." Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Public Action, 14 HAv. L. REv. 1265 (1961).
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numerous members of his class" and was caused by a "pervasive and
persistent climate of community behavior."3 1 However, "the party
who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the
statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforce-
ment and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally." 32
Although the Otey court classifies the injury as one which is "of
a continuing nature,13 3 it would appear more realistic to view any
injury which could result from the enactment of the resolution as
being merely potential and speculative. Even if any injury does result
from the enactment of the resolution, it is equally uncertain that it
would be plaintiff who is harmed. In that case plaintiff is improperly
asserting the rights of others.34 It is certainly questionable whether
plaintiff's claims warrant judicial intervention.35
Enjoining the holding of the election is not necessarily the
proper remedy even in the event that there was a clear showing that
the complainant would have been directly injured. Clearly this re-
quirement must be met, since the resolution is being challenged on
the grounds that it conflicts with the Constitution.3 The general
rule that courts will not restrain the holding of an election 37 is not
without exception; however, even in those jurisdictions in which
officials have been restrained from holding elections, the use of the
equitable injunction is considered an extraordinary remedy and is
granted only on a showing that the plaintiff will be irreparably in-
jured.38
31 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 277 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
32 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 448 (1923); see United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
33 281 F. Supp. at 277.
34 "Usually one may not complain of merely anticipated injury; and even if the
injury complained of is real and immediate, it does not neccessarily warrant the
assertion of the rights, constitutional or otherwise, of others:' Lewis, Constitutional
Rights and the Misuse of Standing, 14 STAN. L. Rnv. 433, 434 (1962).
35 For judicial non-intervention in the area of potential invasion of rights, see
Arizona v. California, 283 US. 423 (1931); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
36 See text accompanying notes 32-34 supra.
32 Cases cited note 14 supra.
a3 See, e.g., Noble v. Lincoln, 153 Neb. 79, 43 N.W.2d 578 (1950); Rheinhart v.
Yancey, 241 N.C. 184, 84 S.E.2d 655 (1954); O'Neil v. Jones, 185 Tenn. 539, 206 S.V.2d
782 (1947). But see Dulaney v. Miami Beach, 96 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1957), in which it is
suggested that the test is injury to the general public; cf. Kavanagh v. Coash, 347 Mich.
579, 81 N.W.2d 349 (1957), which suggests that an election will be enjoined if
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The Otey court focuses on injury to the city of Milwaukee and
not to the plaintiff.3 9 It is certainly possible that the court is correct
in asserting that further racial unrest would result from the "mere
holding of the referendum." Nevertheless,
even when it appears that the proposed ordinance would tran-
scend the legislative powers of the municipal governing body,
and would be unconstitutional or otherwise void, a court of equity
will intervene and grant injunctive relief only when it appears
that irreparable injury will result to the plaintiffs from the mere
passage of the ordinance as distinguished from injury that may
result from the carrying out or enforcement thereof .... 4
It is difficult to see how plaintiff has met this burden of proving ir-
reparable injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law.41
In the absence of a successful appeal, the only course open to
those whose resolution is enjoined from the ballot is to seek amend-
ment to the Constitution. Eugene Rostow defends judicial review
on the basis that it is not undemocratic since the people have the
final responsibility over constitutional review through the process
of constitutional amendment.42 In a sense the injunction could cre-
ate a constitutional crisis. Any attempt to amend the Constitution
would be unnecessarily broad and would have repercussions far be-
yond the limited facts of this particular situation; and the effects
would be far more damaging to the proponents of open housing than
would an unfavorable vote in the election. On the other hand, the
outcome of an election could be favorable to the Negro community.
plaintiff's civil rights are threatened. However, in a fact situation like that in Otey,
the Michigan Supreme Court denied an injunction. Greater Detroit Howeowners
Council v. Wayne Circuit Judge Moynihan, No. 50819-1/2 (Mich. Sup. Ct. May 5, 1964).
39 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 277-78 (E. D. Wis.
1968).
40 Rheinhardt v. Yancey, 241 N.C. 184, 188, 84 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1954).
41 Burden of proof is on plaintiff to show irreparable damage and lack of an
adequate remedy at law. Theurkauf v. Miller, 153 Conn. 159, 214 A.2d 834 (1965). See
O'Neil v. Jones, 185 Tenn. 539, 206 S.W.2d 782 (1947) (injunction denied on ground
that plaintiff has an adequate remedy to test the constitutional issue after the
election). See also Kilpatrick v. Searl, 366 Mich. 335, 115 NAV.2d 112 (1962); Union v.
Conlon, 19 App. Div. 2d 848, 243 N.YS.2d 484 (1963). In Public Service Comm. of
Utah v. Wykoff, 344 U.S. 237, 247 (1952), the Court said:
It is the state courts which have the first and last word as to the meaning
of state statutes and whether a particular order is within the legislative terms
of reference so as to make it the action of the state. We have disapproved
anticipatory declarations as to state regulatory statutes ....
42 Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAav. L. REv. 193, 197
(1952).
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Temperaments have been known to change with the passage of
time, and the pre-election campaign could have the educational ef-
fect on the dissident groups of strengthening the position of the
proponents of open housing. Admittedly, this is only conjecture, but
it is clear that the injunction at this early stage renders the question
moot and prematurely encourages constitutional amendment which
could have disastrous effects on future open-housing legislation.
The Otey court relies on the maxim that "the prinicple of judi-
cial non-interference is one of prudence, not of power." 43 However,
the exercise of "power" by the court may not be the proper course, for
it appears that prudence is warranted. 44 One need not take the posi-
tion that the " 'will of the electorate' should invariably prevail '45
to adopt the view that the facts presented in Otey create a situation
which calls for the exercise of judicial self-restraint. It is not the
function of the courts to indulge in an inquiry into the "wisdom"
of the proposed resolution.46
The 0 tey court recognizes the problems which face the inner city
of Milwaukee and seeks to attack its evils by enjoining the election.
This is, nevertheless, a situation which demands the exercise of
judicial discretion. This is not to say that the court must operate
in a vacuum, oblivious to the need for social reform. Admittedly,
the line which separates a progressive court from one which is ex-
cessive is most difficult to ascertain. An imaginative, progressive and
independent judiciary is the goal, but "The judge, even when he is
free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is
not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or of goodness. . .."47
II. FRF. SPEECH
The situation may not only be one which demands "prudence,"
but also one in which the court is without "power" to act. In addi-
tion to the compelling case for the use of judicial self-restraint, the
premature enjoining of the election raises first amendment issues.
43 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 276 (E. D. Wis. 1963).
44 Cf. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REV.
193, 198 (1952): "Judicial review is ... not to operate as a continuously active factor
in legislative or executive decisions."
45 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Sup. 264, 275 (E. D. Wis. 1968).
The court attacks this as a "fallacious assumption."
46 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (dissenting opinion). See L. HAND,
THE BILL oF PiGHS, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LEcruREs 56 (1958).
47 B. CARwozo, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocss 141 (1921).
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NOTES
The court fears that the "prospect of a vote on the referendum
question would further galvanize public opinion and elicit heated
polemicizing, which in turn would be augmented by fund raising,
billboard advertising, and all the other trappings of a full-fledged
election campaign." 4s However, it is difficult to comprehend the
manner in which the "campaign bally-hoo" would differ from that
of a campaign in which the proponents of open housing were spon-
soring an open-housing resolution. With the tables thus turned, it
is difficult to imagine the court's enjoining the election. If com-
munity reaction had been the test, the civil rights movement never
would have gotten off the ground.
The courts in fact have been inclined to protect those who
create dissent and disrupt community relations. 49 In addition, the
courts have been known to throw a lighted fuse of their own "into
a keg of gunpowder."50 It therefore appears that the court has as-
signed the role of villain to those who favor the proposed resolution.
The court's values with regard to open housing, rather than its fear
of "the long hot summer" has shaped its decision. Despite the court's
honorable intention, it is laying the groundwork for a rule which
invites those with adverse political interests to seek court orders to
restrain the passage of legislation which they find distasteful.5 1
The political debate which would accompany the election, even
if it instigates racial strife, must be judged by first amendment
standards.52 The Otey court's remedy is inconsistent with the design
of the first amendment. The first amendment attempts to achieve
"the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources." 53 The injunctive relief makes effective political
action impossible and renders debate on the issue of the resolution
48 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 278 (E. D. Wis. 1968).
49 See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d
877 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 851 (1948).
50 See Brown v. Topeka Bd. of Educ., 547 U.S. 483 (1954).
51 Letter from Ohio State University Professors in Detroit Free Press (1964).
52 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 576 U.S. 254, 269 (1964):
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace,
obscenity ... and the various other formulae for the repression of expression
that have been challenged in this court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.
By analogy, enjoining the election, out of fear of the consequences of the debate, is a
formula for the "repression of expression."
53 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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academic and moot. The relegation of the debate to such a lowly
status, incapable of resulting in social change, does not satisfy the
standards of the first amendment. Instead, the Constitution protects
free political discussion which is afforded the opportunity to influence
change through the political processes.54 The protection extends to
the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."' 5 The proponents
and opponents of the proposed resolution should be afforded not
only the opportunity of "abstract discussion," but of "vigorous
advocacy" as well.56 This right to debate for political and social
changes is more than simply a personal liberty, it is essential to the
"maintenance of our political system and an open society."r,7
The injunction restraining the election certainly has the effect
of limiting debate on a "volatile" issue, but the right to effective
political debate is not restricted to these situations in which public
anger will not be aroused.58 The election should be conducted
despite the fact that the issue is highly "volatile" and that the debate
will invoke "unsettling consequences." "There is no room under
our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative
would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts,
or dominant political or community groups."5' 9
The Otey court claims that the "educative value of the refer-
54 See Stromberg v. California, 283 US. 359, 369 (1931). See also N.A.A.C.P. v.
Button, 371 US. 415 (1963), where the Court attacks the use or threat of use of
criminal sanctions to deter the exercise of first amendment rights. Although the in-
junction in the Otey case does not deter protected activity to the extent that criminal
sanctions do, it would seem that debate is dearly discouraged.
55 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
56 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 US. 415, 429 (1963). Here the N.A.A.C.P. "exercised
their first amendment rights through litigation." In Otey the proponents of the pro-
posed resolution exercise their rights through an election.
57 Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 874, 389 (1967). Accord, Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts, 388 US. 130 (1967). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 US. 296, 340 (1940).
58 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 377 US. 1
(1949). In Terminiello the petitioner was convicted of violating a municipal ordinance
making breaches of the peace a criminal offense. The trial court instructed the jury
that any misbehavior constitutes a breach of the peace which "stirs the public to
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance
which violates the ordinance." The Supreme Court reversed, saying: "It is the function
of free speech to invite dispute ... or even to stir the public to anger . . . . It may
strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it
presses for acceptance of an idea." 337 U.S. at 3-4.
59 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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endum campaign" is far outweighed by the "potential dangers" of
holding the election.60 However, this balancing of values is not the
test by which to measure the standards of the first amendment. The
first amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely
to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind
of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly;
but we have staked upon it our all."61 If the courts were permitted to
block every election campaign in which it was felt that the "potential
dangers" outweighed the "educative value," the first amendment
would be rendered unduly subservient to the whim of the judiciary.
The determination of the unconstitutionality of the substance of
the proposed resolution was clearly premature.6 2 In this situation
3
the courts are without power to block the political process by a
case-by-case analysis of the utility of the campaign or its educative
value. Such a test improperly places the court in the role of a
political censor.64
60 Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F. Supp. 264, 278 (E. D. Wis. 1968).
61 L. Hand, J., in United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 262, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943).
62 For reasons of "ripeness," "no case or controvery," "standing," and "prudence."
63 "This situation" refers to one in which the constitutionality of the proposed
resolution is only questionable or one in which the proposal is clearly constitutional.
Admittedly, if this were a situation in which the proposed resolution were clearly un-
constitutional on its face, the first amendment question would be much more difficult.
The "effective political debate" argument would lose much of its relevance for it
would be argued that such an ordinance could never become "effective legislation."
Perhaps in that situation the "educative value" could be measured against the "po-
tential dangers." However, the dangers inherent in this test are dear; first amendment
privileges could be denied indirectly through an attack on the substance of the pro-
posed ordinance.
64 Assuming the role of a political censor, the Otey court inquires into the
motives of the MCCV, the group sponsoring the proposed resolution. The Otey court
determines that the MCCV is "opposed" to open-housing legislation at all levels and
applies this to the statement in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 (1967), that for
the purpose of constitutional analysis, the enactment must be construed with "concern
for its immediate objective ... viewed in the light of its historical context and con-
ditions." It is difficult to see how Reitman stands for the proposition that one cannot
oppose open housing. Rather, the Reitman court, after viewing the proposal, the
campaigning, the election result, the enactment, and its application and mode of
enforcement was able to say that the constitutional amendment was unconstitutional.
The court was able to view the "objective" of Proposition 14 (CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 26
(1964), in the light of an historical background which did not permit one to incite
discrimination. Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 531-36, 413 P.2d 825, 827-30, 50
Cal. Rptr. 881, 883-86 (1966), aff'd 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
III. CONCLUSION
The Negro's assimiliation into the mainstream of American
life "will require the most radical changes in the whole structure of
American society."'6 5 Residential segregation is perhaps the most
pressing problem facing our modern cities. 66 As Dr. Hauser stated
at the trial, open-housing legislation is "probably the most important
symbol on the horizon with respect to the next steps in the advance-
ment of the Negro towards equality of opportunity and full citizen-
ship in these United States. ' 67
The role which the courts are to assume in this area is still
not clearly defined. The Otey court, after a thorough inquiry into
the situation in Milwaukee, chose to involve itself directly in the
political thicket. Other courts have proceeded more slowly and
have chosen a more cautious approach "in such an emotionally
involved field as race relations.168
In addition, the requirements, whether permissive or manda-
tory, which courts have adhered to, such as "standing," "ripeness,"
"case or controversy" and other rules of constitutional interpreta-
tion are not mere technicalities to be discarded should a court be so
inclined. It is only too easy to visualize a situation in which the
"tables are turned" and an injunction is sought to restrain an election
on an open-housing ordinance, sponsored by the Negro community,
on the grounds that racial or community disharmony will result
and that it would conflict with the alleged "constitutional right"
to sell property to whom one pleases. A consistent application of
the principles enunciated by the Otey court could result in restrain-
ing such an election.
65 C. SILBERMAN, CISIS IN BLACK AND WHrrE 43 (1964).
66 "Residential segregation of Negroes has actually increased over the past several
decades, despite the improvements in their economic position." Id. See also F. REDL
AND D. WINEMAN, CoNTROLs FROm WrmIN: TECHNIQUES FOR THE TREATMENT OF THE
AGGREsivE CHILD 42-48 (1952), where the authors describe the psychological effect that
architecture, space, and such things as housekeeping have on a child.
67 Testimony of Dr. P. Hauser, Otey v. Common Council of Milwaukee, 281 F.
Supp. 264, 270 (E. D. Wis. 1968).
68 Porter v. Oberlin, 1 Ohio St.2d 143, 152, 205 N.E.2d 363, 369 (1965). Accord,
Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. Chicago, 36 II1.2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793 (1967). See Greater
Detroit Homeowners Council v. Wayne Circuit Judge Moynihan, No. 50819! (Mich.
Sup. Ct. May 5, 1964); State ex. rel. Hunter v. Erickson, 12 Ohio St.2d 116, 233 N.E.2d
129 (1967) where the Supreme Court of Ohio approved the special classification of any
ordinance which "regulates the use, sale, advertisement, transfer ... lease . .. of real
property on the basis of race . . ." so that it must first be approved by the electors,
rather than permitting such an ordinance to become effective "as do other ordinances:'
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The first amendment protects effective political debate; and
"free trade in ideas means free trade in the opportunity to persuade
to action, not merely to describe facts."109 Community harmony
cannot be achieved, nor is it "worth achieving by sacrificing free
and unfettered political debate." 70
The problem necessitates a clarification of the role which the
courts will assume in this radical but delicate process of change. This
is not to say that exact guidelines need be articulated, nor is it to say
that vital needs of the Negro are to be sacrificed. Nevertheless, the
courts must exercise self-restraint, for
it certainly does not accord with the underlying presuppositions
of popular government to vest in a chamber, unaccountable to
anyone but itself, the power to suppress social experiments which
it does not approve. Nothing, I submit, could warrant such a
censorship except a code of paramount law that not only
measured the scope of legislative authority but regulated how it
should be excercised.
Each of us must in the end choose for himself how far he
would like to leave our collective fate to the wayward vagaries
of popular assemblies .... For myself it would be most irksome
to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians .... 71
Jeffrey E. Fromson
69 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
70 Letter from Ohio State University Professors in Detroit Free Press (1964).
71 L. HAND, TnE BILL OF RoIGHs, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LEcruREs 13
(1958).
